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On 10 June a key debate in the European Parliament on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) was suspended. As Gabriel Siles-Brügge and Nicolette Butler write, much of
the criticism of TTIP has focused on its impact on public healthcare systems and the role of
‘corporate tribunals’. They argue that this overlooks one of TTIP’s central purposes: a series of
provisions that could make it more diﬃcult for governments to regulate in the public interest for the
sake of promoting regulatory convergence between the EU and the US.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (or TTIP), a free trade agreement being
negotiated between the EU and the US, has been the subject of much controversy. In the UK,
criticism has focused on two things: the impact that the agreement would have on the NHS and the
ability of multinationals to sue governments in international arbitration tribunals (thus bypassing
domestic courts) using what is known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
While the impact of TTIP in these areas is certainly likely to be problematic, these headlines bypass
an important aspect of the agreement that warrants further scrutiny: its provisions on ‘regulatory
convergence’. Of course, the term is enough to put most people to sleep, but it is seen as the main purpose of the
negotiations. Given that tariﬀs between the EU and the US are generally very low, the main existing ‘trade barrier’
between both parties is said to be diﬀerences in the way that both economies are regulated. For example, the EU
and US have diﬀerent standards for chemicals or motor vehicles – and advocates of TTIP are likely to tell you  that
levelling such diﬀerences (by adopting a common standard, harmonisation, or ‘mutually recognising’ the standards
of the other party) helps to promote ‘growth and jobs’ and global economic leadership.
The argument has been made elsewhere as to why
these two promises are unlikely to be delivered. Our
focus here is on the potential deregulatory eﬀect that
regulatory convergence might have. The negotiations
on regulatory cooperation feature two other main
components. These are a series of ‘sectoral
chapters’ where negotiators are trying to bridge the
regulatory gap for a speciﬁc set of goods and
services (not just chemicals and motor vehicles but
also things like cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and
textiles) and chapters covering Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
measures (building on similar provisions incorporated
into WTO Law).
However, given the diﬃculties in bridging quite
signiﬁcant regulatory diﬀerences in such areas as
food or chemicals safety, as well as the entrenched
interests of regulators, much of the focus of the
negotiations has been on a so-called ‘horizontal’
regulatory cooperation chapter. This was not only the principal subject of the last round of TTIP talks held in New
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York at the end of April, but is also what a lot of business groups are pinning their hopes on (as we argue in a
recently published policy brieﬁng).
Based on the EU’s proposal as tabled in New York, the main aim of this ‘horizontal chapter’ is to cut across all areas
of regulation and institutionalise a process of ‘regulatory exchange’ between both parties. This would see the US
federal government and the EU having to provide each other with a list of planned legislative acts, to be analysed for
their potential impact on transatlantic trade. Similar procedures would exist for the ‘non-central’ level of decision-
making (US State governments and EU Member States), although the procedure would be less onerous. The
proposed chapter would also institutionalise stakeholder (in particular, business input) into the regulatory process
through a so-called ‘regulatory cooperation body’ (RCB) composed of representatives of both parties that would
oversee the process.
The fear here, voiced by numerous NGOs and critical scholars, is that such procedures would result in ‘regulatory
chill’. By having to subject their proposals to such scrutiny – where the principal metric is the extent to which such
measures unduly impinge on transatlantic trade rather than a broader social, environmental or public health
objective – the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest would be constrained. Of course, the exact
impact of such ‘non-decisions’ is very diﬃcult to gauge, but these moves are certainly intended to move regulators
and legislators in the direction of doing ‘less’ rather than ‘more’.
In this vein, evidence did emerge recently that suggested that the mere fact that negotiations on TTIP were taking
place was already inducing regulatory chill. The European Commission is alleged to have postponed legislation on
endocrine-disrupting chemicals in pesticides as a result of pressure from US trade negotiators and business
interests. What all of this suggests is that, headlines on the NHS and ISDS aside, it’s time more people started
reading the ﬁne print when it comes to TTIP.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article draws on a Policy Brieﬁng prepared by the authors together with stakeholders on the current state
of the TTIP talks. This was funded by an ESRC Impact Acceleration Account. The summary of this policy brieﬁng
originally appeared at the Manchester Policy Blogs. The article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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